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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 940724-CA

:

PAUL G. BREDEHOFT,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION ATTO NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for automobile homicide,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (2)
(1990) , in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Has defendant demonstrated that an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance?
The trial court's findings of fact on rule 23B remand will not
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

Since no lower court has ruled on

defendant's ineffective assistance claim, this Court will treat the
question as one of law. See State v. Arcruelles. 921 P.2d 439, 440
(Utah 1996).

2.

Where defendant was lawfully arrested for DUI after an injury

accident, did the continuous dissipation of his blood alcohol create
an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw?
The trial court's conclusion that exigent circumstances justified
a warrantless search is reviewed for correctness; underlying factual
findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
City of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1994).
3.

Did defendant preserve his claim that he was not given

statutory notice of one of the State's experts, where he never
communicated to the court that ground for his trial objection?
Resolution of this issue does not require review of any action
of the trial court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following
provisions, the text of which is reproduced in addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
S
§
§
§
§

32A-12-103 (1993)
32A-12-204 (1993)
32A-14-101 (1993)
41-6-44(1) (1993)
41-6-44.5 (1993)
76-5-207(2) (1990)
77-17-13 (1995)
77-23-4(2) (1990).
STATEMENT OP THE CASE

Defendant was charged by Information dated 7 March 1994 as
follows:
Count I

Criminal homicide, automobile homicide, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-207(2) ;
2

Count II

Driving on denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked license, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227;

Count III

Driving without registration or certificate of
title, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1303; or in the alternative,
license plate and registration violation, a class
C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-la-1305(4);

Count IV

Operation of vehicle without security, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-12a-302.

(R. 8-11) . Defendant pled guilty to counts II through IV as charged
(R. 163-64). Count I (automobile homicide) went to trial (R. 177) .
The State's motion in limine to admit defendant's nine prior
DUI convictions between 1981 and 1993 and related information was
denied in part and granted in part (R. 43-44, 129-31).
On 11 July 1994, the State filed a motion to compel expert
witnesses (R. 34-35); on 29 July 1994, defendant filed a motion to
compel notice of experts under Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (a) (b)
& (2) (R. 81-82) . On 9 August 1994, both parties were ordered "to
provide to one another a list of expert witnesses, including the
addresses and phone numbers of those witnesses. Both parties [were]
further required to provide a brief written statement or report
prepared by the witness regarding that witness' [s] proposed testimony
at trial" (R. 128).
Defendant's motions to suppress the arrest and the results of
a blood alcohol test were denied and the trial court entered findings
and conclusions (R. 172-76) . After a six-day trial, a jury returned
a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 177-85, 292) .
3

At sentencing, defense counsel moved the court to reduce
defendants conviction one degree to a third degree felony pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) (R. 1986).

The court denied

this motion (R. 1992) . The court sentenced defendant to statutory
terms (misdemeanor terms to run concurrent to each other, but
consecutive to the felony term) , a $10,000 fine, and full restitution
(R. 300-03, 307), Defendant timely appealed (R. 319).
Pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
Court remanded the case with instructions (R. 2109) . The trial court
entered findings of fact on remand (R. 2125-32).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Facts

of the

Crime

Breakdown. In the evening of 1 March 1994, seven Highland High
School boys were driving the "silver bullet" - - a 1977 Chevrolet
Malibu station wagon -- from a pre-game tailgate party to a Bountiful
football game (R. 705-707, 711, 756, 831, 844, 865-66, 996, 1018) .2
At about 7:10 p.m., while driving west on 1-80, they blew a tire
(R. 708, 711-13, 997) . They exited at the 218t South collector system
and pulled over into the safety lane to change the tire (R. 709,
711-713, 758-59, 792, 832-33, 868) . The boys worked on the car until
about 7:35 p.m., but were unable to fix the tire (R. 714-17, 761) .
1

This brief recites facts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State V, Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989) .
2

No alcohol was served at the tailgate party (R. 706, 756,

865)
4

Collision. At this time, Eric Wadley, who was sitting in the
car, noticed a light fill the interior of the car more than other
cars had done (R. 768) .3 In fact, a car in the emergency lane was
accelerating toward the boys1 vehicle from behind, reaching a speed
of approximately 50 to 65 miles per hour (R. 722, 745-46, 769, 800-01,
841-42, 875, 1001, 1402).4
The next thing Eric remembered was "hearing screams from [his]
friends, . • . grabbing the steering wheel and holding onto it and
feeling an impact of another car. And then [he] blacked out" (R.
769) . The car, a red Mustang driven by defendant, never slowed or
took evasive action, but slammed into the rear of the station wagon,
knocking it 33 feet and "over the top of the guardrail" (R; 1591,
723-24, 729-30, 771-72, 841, 877, 946, 1166, 1404-05, 1541)-

Two

of the boys were sitting in the car; others jumped the guardrail
to safety (R. 843).
The boys soon realized that one of the boys, Sean Adkins, was
gone (R. 725, 877, 1004) . They discovered his body on the roadway
some 113 feet down the road laying face down, but with his eyes open
(R. 726, 877, 1004-05, 1590).

Sean had been struck, probably by

the station wagon, as he was running away (R. 1407, 1538) . He was
dead on arrival at LDS Hospital (R. 1043-45).

3

The headlights of other cars that passed the boys' car had
not shined directly into the rearview mirror (R. 783).
4

The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour (R. 1123,

1405).
5

Intoxication. Following the collision, defendant was found sitting
on the guardrail with a broken finger and a cut lip (R. 843, 878,
1169). He smelled strongly of alcohol (R. 878, 1166). Defendant
told an officer on the scene that he had consumed six drinks, mostly
beer (R. 1167-68) . Defendant was "extremely intoxicated" (R. 1259);
a later blood test showed his blood alcohol level to be .27 percent
weight volume (R. 1229-30), a level that would leave many persons
approaching a comatose state (R. 1248).5
An ambulance took defendant, Trooper Peterson, and one of the
boys to a hospital (R. 729-30) . En route defendant repeated, f,0h
my God, I killed somebody" two or three times (R. 1177, 731) .
Defendant was examined at the hospital (R. 958-59). His injuries
were "quite minor" (R. 966) . When asked what had happened, defendant
responded, "I was driving drunk and I killed a kid" (R. 1823).
Defendant's trial testimony. At trial, defendant claimed that
the collision resulted when another car forced him into the emergency
lane (R. 1944-47) . On cross-examination, he conceded that he had
consumed alcohol at three different bars, including Uncle Bart's
and Charlie's Club, where he had gone looking for his friend Doug
Mickelson (R. 1949-53) . However, he testified that he did not feel
intoxicated on the night of the homicide (R. 1955-56).

5

As a former student in the Dayspring alcohol and drug
rehabilitation program, defendant was aware of the effects of
large amounts of alcohol upon his coordination, attention, and
functioning (R. 1239-42).
6

Facts

from the Suppression

Hearing

Hearing. Trooper Jeff Peterson was the only witness in the hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress the arrest for lack of probable
cause and motion to suppress the blood evidence were heard together
(R. 410-411).
The accident occurred at 7:35 p.m. and Trooper Peterson arrived
at about 8:00 p.m. (R. 438-39). He saw defendant "sitting on the
guardrail on the west side of the collector" (R. 417) . He observed
"a strong odor of alcoholic beverage" on defendant's breath, "slurred
speech," "flaccid muscle tone" in defendantfs face, "otosis, or droopy
eyes," "bloodshot eyes,"and "poor coordination" (isi.). Defendant
told the trooper that had had had six drinks, " [m]ostly beer" (i£.) .
Trooper Peterson noticed an open beer can laying on the floor board
of defendant's wrecked Mustang (R. 418).
Defendant was led to an ambulance and placed under arrest for
driving under the influence and, if the injured boy died, automobile
homicide (R. 419-20, 430, 436). Trooper Peterson's "main concern
was the body was metabolizing that alcohol"; he wanted to draw blood
as soon as possible in order to "have an accurate indication of what
his blood alcohol was at the time of the accident" (R. 437) . Relying
upon Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1966), he determined
to draw defendant's blood with or without defendant's consent, and
advised him that they would be taking his blood

(R. 423-24).

Defendant "produced his arm and gave his blood" (Ad.) . One of the
ambulance personnel made the blood draw at 8:18 p.m. (R. 431).

7

Trooper Peterson did not attempt to obtain a telephonic warrant
(R. 432) . He believed that at 8 o'clock on a Wednesday night the
deputy county attorneys "would not be in their office and it would
be quite an ordeal to get a hold of the county attorney that was
on call and initiate that telephonic search warrant" (R. 432-33).
Argument. Defendant argued that the blood test results should
have been suppressed because Officer Peterson did not obtain a
telephonic warrant prior to the blood draw (R. 445-50).
Ruling. The court had no evidence before it of the "exact steps
and time necessary to get that search warrant" or "as to whether
or not there was any magistrate available for receipt of a telephonic
search warrant, " including the availability of recording capabilities
(R. 455, 458) . The court admitted the blood test results based
on its oral finding that "there did exist exigent circumstances which*
obviated the need for a warrant in this matter" (R.

459-60).

Findings. The court found that "Trooper Jeff Peterson was properly
concerned about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible
loss or corruption of that evidence, that time was critical in
obtaining evidence of blood alcohol level, that the offense was
serious and that the exigent circumstances obviated the need to obtain
a search warrant" (R. 174-75).

It further found "that there was

no evidence before the Court that a magistrate with the proper
equipment as required by Utah law was available and prepared to do
a telephonic search warrant" (R. 175)•

8

Facts
Prior relationship.

from the 23B Remand
Since 1984, attorney James Mickelson1s

practice included criminal and private club law (R. 2204) . He knew
defendant since the late 1970's or early '80's (R. 2197-98). They
were on a first name basis, had known each other for almost 15 years,
had dealt with each other in both social and business situations
(R. 2202) . Mr. Mickelson even represented defendant on one DUI case
in the 1980's (R. 2198-99).

Defendant was also on a first-name

basis with Mr. Mickelsonfs parents and his then wife (R. 2200) .
Defendant knew that Uncle Bart's and Charlie's Club were Mickelson
family operations, and had even performed janitorial and other
services for them on a contractual basis (R. 2198-2200).
Drinking establishments. Charlie's Club and Uncle Bart's are
non-profit private clubs that serve liquor (R. 2138, 2143) . In 1994,
Mr. Mickelson was an officer anH trustee of the clubs; the other
officers and trustee were all his family members (R. 2139, 2142,
2144).

Club Management, Inc., a for-profit corporation, manages

Charlie's Club and is paid management fees (R. 2139-40, 2190) . Mr.
Mickelson was a 50% owner, an officer, and a director of Club
Management, Inc.; the other officers were all his family members
(R. 2140, 2144-45, 2172) . Mr. Mickelson did not receive any money
from Club Management, Inc. directly, such as in the form of dividends
(R. 2140, 2191) . Revenue generated by these three entities is his
parents' sole livelihood (R. 2246).

9

Mr. Mickelson was the registered agent for all three corporations
and advised them on corporate and regulatory issues, including during
the period of this case (R. 2154, 2165, 2172, 2184).

He may have

received attorney's fees for his work (R. 2139). However, he did
not represent them at any time in any matter connected with the
homicide (R. 2164, 2184).

Nor did he represent any employees of

the entities in any capacity (R. 2174).
Attorney-client discussions. After defendant committed the
homicide, a mutual friend requested that Mr. Mickelson visit defendant
in jail, which he did (R. 2162) .

Defendant was "more than just

a simple client" for Mr. Mickelson (R. 2202) . Because of their prior
relationship, Mr. Mickelson considered their relationship one of
personal as well as professional trust (R. 2202) .
Mr. Mickelson twice discussed with defendant the possibility
that civil claims could be asserted against them both (R. 2163-64,
2167-71).

The first discussion occurred between the homicide and

the preliminary hearing (R. 2167).

Mr. Mickelson discussed the

potential for conflict arising out of a possible future civil action
(R. 2168).

He considered the likelihood of criminal liability on

the part of the business entities to be "near zero"

(R. 216P).

He explained that, because of his ties to the clubs, there was
a possibility that unconsciously he might do or not do something
that would affect his representation (R. 2171, 2179) . He continued,
" ^ m loyal to you[;] the clubs . . . admit that you were in there
drinking and that--but . . . my interest was in defending [defendant]
and I didn't think I would be affected by it" (R. 2171).
10

Before the second discussion, Mr. Mickelson reviewed the Rules
of Professional Conduct and discussed the matter with attorneys in
his office (R. 2181) . During his discussion with defendant, defendant
said that he understood the issue and asked Mr. Mickelson to continue
to represent him (R. 2203-04).

Mr. Mickelson suggested that he

consult with another attorney, but defendant said he felt comfortable
with Mr. Mickelson (R. 2204; see also R. 2179-80).
In both discussions, Mr. Mickelson told defendant that he was
involved with the clubs, but defendant was already aware of that
fact (R. 2170, 2182) . Mr. Mickelson thus explained that there would
be a conflict of interest if the victim's parents named both the
private clubs and defendant in a civil suit (R. 2170).
Mr. Mickelson did not believe that he had an actual conflict
in this case, only that the possibility of a potential conflict
existed (R.

2164).

Accordingly, he made no disclosures to the

magistrate or judge and prepared no written waiver (R. 2163-64).
His notes concerning conflicts from one of the discussions with
defendant were not available at the 2 — ~ 23B hearing (R. 2166-67) .6
From 1984 to 1996, Mr. Mickelson1 s practice included incorporating
private clubs and related regulatory matters (R. 2147-48). He was
aware of the Dram Shop Act and that the clubs involved in this case
6

Mr. Mickelson did take notes of his discussion with
defendant of the conflict of interest issue during one of their
meetings (R. 2166-67, 2217-18). These notes were placed in
defendant's file (R. 2218). However, Mr. Mickelson later
released the file to the Salt Lake Legal Defenders for copying
(R. 2166-67, 2219). After recovering the file from LDA, Mr.
Mickelson went through it page by page, but has not been able to
find those notes (R. 2166-67)
11

faced potential civil liability for serving liquor to defendant
on 1 March 1994 (R. 2147, 2158).

He believed that a civil action

would entail a determination of comparative fault, although he did
not consider himself to have any exposure (R. 2159).
Civil action. In November 1994, the parents of defendant's victim
filed a civil action against Uncle Bart's, Charley's Club# Club
Management, Inc., James Mickelson, Doug Mi eke 1 son (James's father) ,
Paul Bredehoft, and others (R. 2149-50, Ex. D-6) . James Mickelson
never believed that he or any members of his family had any personal
liability (R. 2195-97) , and they were in fact dismissed out of the
case before it went to trial (R. 2152, 2195-97).
Criminal exposure. In his practice, Mr. Mickelson reviews all
the publications from the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
that identify cases and types of liquor violations (R. 2208).
Nevertheless, he was not aware of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1990) ,
relating to vicarious criminal liability imposed upon an officer
of a corporation operating a licensed club where a criminal violation
occurs (R. 21F6) . He was unaware of any case where the prosecution
sought to use the testimony of the person charged with DUI against
the establishment that served the alcohol (R. 2210), nor did he
believe a prosecutor would make a deal with a felony defendant in
order to bring misdemeanor charges against the taverns (R. 2210-11) .
No plea bargain. Three to five times, Mr. Mickelson broached
the subject of a plea bargain with prosecutors (R. 2173, 2211).
However, in the screening process the County Attorney's office had
12

determined that this case would not be plea bargained because of
defendant's prior history (R. 2215).

In addition, the victim had

died and the case had received extensive publicity (R. 2214-15).
Consequently, the prosecutors never showed any willingness to consider
a plea bargain or to compromise the case in any way (R. 2173, 2215,
2217) . Even when it briefly appeared that a mistrial might eventuate,
prosecutors rebuffed Mr. Mickelson's plea offer, stating,

,f

We!ll

take our chances here, we're not pleading itM (R. 2216-17).
Since Mr. Mickelson had "never heard of a club being charged
on these kinds of facts with . . . criminal conduct" he never "made
any offers about testimony or information that [defendant] may have
had relating to misconduct or possible misconduct by the bars" (R.
2173). Mr. Mickelson testified without contradiction that, had he
"received any evidence that there was any possible conduct on the
part of the bars that would benefit

[defendant, he] would have

immediately withdrawn" (R. 2174).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. James Mickelson did have ties to the clubs where defendant
had been drinking.

However, they created at most a hypothetical

conflict, not an actual one.
at trial.
2.

Nor did they affect his performance

Defendant's choices reflect thoughtful trial strategy.

Because defendant was lawfully arrested, the dissipation

of his blood alcohol created an exigency justifying the warrantless
blood draw.

Utah and foreign cases agree that the State is not

required to prove the unavailability of a telephonic warrant.
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3.

Defendant failed to preserve below his claim that Dr.

Middleton's testimony violates the expert witness notice statute.
The record is clear that, while defendant may have intended this
objection, the trial court reasonably did not understand defendant
to be asserting this ground.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT AN ACTUAL CONFLICT
OF INTEREST ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS LAWYER'S PERFORMANCE
Defendant claims to have been denied effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his trial
counsel, James Mickelson, labored under an actual conflict of
interest.

Br. of Aplt. at 10-ll.7

This conflict of interest arose, defendant argues, because two.
of the clubs that served him liquor before the homicide were owned
and operated by Mickelson family members, including Mr. Mickelson
himself.

Br. Aplt. at 11.

7

Although defendant nominally refers to article I, section
12 of the Utah Constitution, B£& Br. Aplt. at 1, 8, 10, 26, he
offers no separate analysis. Accordingly, no independent state
constitutional claim is before this Court,fififiState v. Laffertv.
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) (declining to engage in state
constitutional analysis where no argument for different analyses
under the state and federal constitutions was briefed), habeas
corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546
(10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992); State v.
Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to
reach state constitutional challenge absent independent state
constitutional analysis).
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A.

To prevail/ defendant must prove that an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.

Ineffectiveness claims are two-pronged. "First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient"; second, "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
"Judicial

scrutiny

deferential."

of

counsel's performance

must

be highly

XsL at 689.

For purposes of assessing prejudice, ineffectiveness claims
fall into three categories:
1.

First are cases of "complete denial of counsel." United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) . This category includes
cases where "counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from
assisting the accused during a critical stage of the rr:.. -ding,"
or where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing." ifl. at 659, 659 n.25.
cases, prejudice is presumed.

In such

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692.

2. "One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar,
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. " Id. These are cases
where "counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest." Id.
The rule for these cases "is not quite the per se rule of prejudice"
applied in cases of the first category.

Id.

"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that
counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that !an
15

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance. 'ff Id- (quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350
(1980)).8 "Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest
actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief." Cuvler. 446 U.S.
at 349-50 (finding no actual conflict) . "But until a defendant shows
that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has
not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of
ineffective assistance"; "the possibility of conflict is insufficient
to impugn a criminal conviction

fl

!£. at 350.

3. "Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject
to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove
prejudice, " that is, a "reasonable probability" of a different result.
StricKlanfl, 466 U.S. at 693-94.
Defendant here asserts a claim of the second type. Accordingly,
in order to prevail on appeal he must demonstrate that Mr. Mickelson
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected" Mr. Mickelson1 s performance."
Cuvler. 446 U.S. at 349-50.

8

Prejudice is presumed without more where a defendant
objects at trial to a conflict of interest but the trial court
does not grant an opportunity to show that the potential conflict
impermissibly imperils the right to a fair trial. Cuyler, 446
U.S. at 348; State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990).
16

B.

Any conflict of interest was hypothetical, not actual.

In arguing that defendant labored under an actual conflict of
interest, defendant relies on three theories: (1) Mr. Mickelson and
his family faced potential criminal liability for the homicide
committed by defendant;

(2) Mr. Mickelson and his family faced

potential civil liability for the homicide committed by defendant;
and (3) Mr. Mickelson was a potential witness at defendant's criminal
trial.

See Br. Aplt. at 11, 17.

"In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to suggest
an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests."

Webb,

790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted) ; Edens v. Hannicran, 87 F.3d 1109,
1113 (10th Cir. 1996) (defendant must "show specific instances of
an actual conflict adverse to his interests") (citations omitted)*.
"There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant conflict." Webb,
790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted) . If an attorney was not forced
to choose between possible alternative courses of actions, "the
conflict remained hypothetical." Xfi.

(citations omitted). Thus,

where a single attorney represents co-defendants in a criminal case,
" [a]n actual conflict of interest exists when the respective defenses
of multiple defendants are inconsistent, i.e., if introduction of
probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly
benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another defendant
whom the same counsel is representing." !£. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
17

,f

Until a defendant shows an actual conflict, he has not established

the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance."
Id- at 76 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Mr. Mickelson never faced the dilemma of choosing between
alternative courses of action. No evidence that would benefit the
clubs but damage defendant, or vice versa, ever arose, and the
interests of the clubs and defendant were consistent. ££. People
v. Richardson. 287 N.E.2d 517, 518 (111. App. 1972) (finding conflict
where attorney's contingent fee in dramshop action on behalf of
children of deceased wife increased with sentence imposed on husband
whom attorney represented in criminal case).

Accordingly, any

conflict of interest Mr. Mickelson labored under was hypothetical
and therefore insufficient to support a Sixth Amendment claim.
1.

In the unlikely event that the Mickelson* and their
businesses had criminal exposure, their interests
aligned with defendant's.

It is doubtful that any member of the Mickelson family faced
criminal liability as a result of defendant's homicidal driving.
An obscure criminal statute in Title 32A of the Utah Code appears
to impose prima facie vicarious criminal liability on the "occupant"
of a licensed club for the criminal acts of the employees. S&& Utah
Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1) (1993) .*

Furnishing alcohol to an

apparently intoxicated person is such an act. StSS. section 32A-12-204.
If the violation is committed by a corporation or association,

9

The term "occupant" is not defined in the Utah Code or
Utah Administrative Code.
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"the officer or agent of the corporation or association in charge
of the premises in which the offense is committed" is prima facie
liable for the offense committed. Section 32A-12-103 (2) . Violation
of this title is a class B misdemeanor.

Section 32A-12-104.

However, defendant has not shown that these sections would have
created prima facie criminal exposure for Mr. Mickelson or his family
members.

The record does not demonstrate that any member of the

Mickelson family was the "occupant" of either of the clubs the evening
of the homicide. Moreover, since the clubs were owned and operated
by corporations, any offense would seem to have been "committed by
a corporation." The owners and officers of these corporations were
Mickelson family members; however, the businesses employed about
30 other people as well (R. 2246) . The record does not establish
that any Mickelson family member was "the officer or agent of the
corporation or association in charge of the premises in which the
offense fwasl committed" that night. Section 32A-12-103 (2) (emphasis
added).10 Although Mr. Mickelson1 s father, Doug Mickelson, did manage
the "day-to-day operations of Charlie's Club" (R. 2198) , defendant
testified that Doug Mickelson was not at the club when he drank there
on 1 March 1994 (R. 1952-53) . Accordingly, this Court cannot find

10

Defendant's assertion that this section "provides for
criminal liability for officers and agents of a corporation when
an offense occurs," Br. Aplt. at 13, is overbroad. The section
applies only to "the officer or agent of the corporation or
association in charge of the premises in which the offense is
committed." Section 32A-12-103(2) (emphasis added). Even then,
the section provides only that such a person is "prima facie
considered a party to the offense . . . " Is£.
19

that Mr. Mickelson or his family members faced even prima facie
criminal liability for defendant's homicidal driving on 1 March 1994.
Moreover, Mr. Mickelson was not aware of these statutes, did
not "see any criminal liability here on these clubs' parts," and
saw no indication that prosecutors had "any desire to seek criminal
liability on behalf of the clubs" (R. 2156, 2171, 2179, 2182).
Defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, holding
that an ineffectiveness claim based on an actual conflict of interest
is supported by a conflict of which the attorney is unaware.
Finally, if the clubs had been exposed to any criminal liability,
and if they or Mr. Mickelson had known of it, their interest would
have been consistent with defendant's.

The clubs' interest would

have been in establishing that defendant was not "apparently under
the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages." Section 32A-12204.

This was also defendant's interest.

He could not alter his

blood alcohol level. However, the jury was more likely to believe
that he was forced into the emergency lane by another car if, as
Charlie's Club bartender Gloria Anderson testified, he "appeared
just normal, " was "talking straight, " "slurring no words, " and walking
normally when he left the club (R. 1639-44).
Thus, the testimony of Gloria Anderson benefitted both defendant
and the clubs.

Mr. Mickelson was not faced with the choice of

benefitting one at the expense of the other. Any conflict of interest
he suffered was thus not actual, but hypothetical only.
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2.

Since the fault of dramshops and drunk drivers
is never compared, their interests are aligned
in civil actions tinder the Dramshop Act.

One who serves alcohol to a person whom the server "knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages" is liable civilly for injuries
resulting from the intoxication. Section 32A-14-101 (1) (c) (1994) .
The server's employer is vicariously liable. Section 32A-14-101 (2) .
Any civil liability here was limited to liability of the
corporations for the acts of their employees. The clubs did not
deny defendant's presence on the date of the homicide (R. 2182).
Defendant has never proven that any server was employed by an
individual, and in fact the record intimates that the servers were
employed by the corporate entities (R. 2246-47) . Assuming arguendo
that club employees served defendant when they knew or should have
known he was intoxicated, they would be liable to his victims and
their corporate employers would be vicariously liable. Mr. Mickelson
believed at the time that neither he nor any member of his family
would be civilly liable; this belief was subsequently borne out when
they were all dismissed from the civil action (R. 2152, 2159, 219597) . Accordingly, any possible conflict was limited to the clubs
and did not extend to Mr. Mickelson or his family members personally.
However, the clubs' interest would have been consistent with
defendant's interest in a civil trial. The only context in which
defendant's interest and the clubs' interest would appear to clash
is in assessing comparative fault. However, the Dramshop Act makes
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"dramshop owners strictly liable without regard to the finding of
fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on their part.,f Reeves
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991).

Hence,

ff

the doctrine

of comparative negligence does not have application to dramshop
defendants." !£. Nevertheless, a dramshop defendant is entitled
to have the jury compare the negligence of the drunk driver against
the negligence of the plaintiff, and to receive a commensurate
reduction in the damages assessed against it. is|. at 117-18. Hence,
the interest of the dramshop and the interest of the drunk driver
are aligned, not opposed, in the civil context.
Accordingly, under Reeves v. Gentile no actual conflict of
interest arose from the possibility of a future civil action against
both defendant and the Mickelson family businesses.
3.

Defendant cites no personal information within
counsel's knowledge that would have made him a
potential witness at defendant's trial*

Defendant's assertion that Mr. Mickelson's "knowledge of the
policies at the clubs could have made him a witness at Mr. Bredehoft' s
trial," Br. Aplt. at 17, fails on the record*

Mr. Mickelson had

no "personal information regarding the facts underlying his client! s
charges."

Statg Vt Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah App. 1991)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Government of Virgin
Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3rd Cir. 1984)). Defendant has
identified no fact within Mr. Mickelson1s knowledge even remotely
relevant to the criminal trial. Nothing suggests that Mr. Mickelson
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was present at Charlie's Club or Uncle Bart's while defendant was
drinking there, nor was he present at the scene of the homicide.
Consequently, no finding of actual conflict of interest can
rest on the theory that counsel was a potential trial witness.
C.

Any possible conflict did not adversely affect counsel's
performance.

Defendant claims that Man actual conflict adversely affected
Mr. Mickelson's performance."

Br. Aplt. at 25 (capitalization

removed) . Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Mickelson labored under
an actual conflict of interest, it did not adversely affect his
performance.
In reviewing such a claim in Webb, this Court considered factors
such as (1) whether a defense strategy was prompted by a desire or
effort to favor another at the client's expense; (2) whether counsel
had viable defense options to pursue; (3/ whether other reasonably
competent counsel would have chosen a different defense strategy;
(4) whether a different strategy would have benefitted defendant;
and (5) whether a tactical reason underlay counsel's action. Webb,
790 P.2d at 76.
1.

No plea bargain was possible.

That Mr. Mickelson did not attempt to trade defendant's testimony
against the Mickelson family and their businesses for charging or
sentencing concessions is not an adverse effect of a conflict of
interest as defendant claims. S£SL Br. Aplt. at 25.
First of all, no plea bargain of any description was possible
in this case. The prosecutors flatly refused to consider a plea
23

bargain. In the screening process the County Attorney's office had
already determined that this case would not be plea bargained because
of defendant's prior history (R. 2215).

In addition, the victim

had died and the case had received extensive publicity (R. 2114-15) .
Consequently, at no time did the prosecutors give any indication
that they would consider a plea bargain or be willing to compromise
the case in any way (R. 2173, 2215, 2217).

Failure to achieve a

plea bargain is not an adverse effect attributable to an actual
conflict of interest where prosecutors are unwilling to bargain.
See Buroer v. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776, 786-87 (1987).
In addition, the offer defendant now advocates is unrealistic.
On these facts, experienced prosecutors would never reduce a second
degree felony charge against the actual perpetrator of the homicide
in exchange for his testimony against the dramshops or their owners
on vicarious-liability class B misdemeanor charges.11
Finally, counsel's decision to forego making such an offer was
not motivated by favoritism. Mr. Mickelson was unaware of section
32A-12-103. He believed, and correctly so, that neither he nor any
member of his family had any criminal exposure.
This was not a case like Edens v. Hanniaan. fiUE£&. There, an
attorney named Schultz represented co-defendants Edens and Lemons
in a murder case.

87 F.3d at 1112. Edens was the less culpable,

11

Furthermore, the offer to testify against club personnel
would have been an admission of defendant's further guilt. In
order to testify that they unlawfully sold an alcoholic beverage
to an intoxicated person, see section 32A-12-204, defendant would
have had to testify that he was intoxicated, making his purchase
of the beverage equally unlawful. See Section 32A-12-210.
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but Lemons' family paid Schultz ' s fees. Id. at 1112, 1117. "Edens'
only defense was in conflict with the defense presented for Lemons."
l£l. at 1116. In fact, Schultz actually told Lemons that "it would
be advantageous to have Edens as a codefendant because Edens could
not then be used as a state1 s witness against Lemons." Id. Schultz
called Lemons to testify, but never cross-examined him on Edens1
behalf.

I£. at 1117. Although Edens wanted to testify, Schultz

told him he could not. Id-

Although Edens was the less culpable

defendant, the attorney refused to pursue a plea bargain on his behalf
"because such an arrangement would have been in direct conflict with
Lemons1 defense." I£.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found

that "Schultz labored under an actual conflict of interest which
adversely affected his representation of Edens." Id- at 1118.
2.

Defendant's only viable defense required that he
testify.

Mr. Mickelson1 s decision to call defendant to testify was based
on sound trial strategy. In fact, ne had no plausible option except
to call defendant.

££. Webb, 790 P.2d at 76.

Mr. Mickelson testified that the central problem facing the
defense was explaining why defendant was driving in the emergency
lane (R. 2237) . Defendant told Mr. Mickelson that there was "another
vehicle which had forced him into the emergency lane" (R. 2236).
Counsel accordingly made the strategic choice to run a defense based
on the "sudden emergency" doctrine (R. 2235).12
12

This required

£££ teg Vt Mitchell Funeral Ifomeftnfryfl»nc3Ssrvt* eoe
(continued...)
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defendant to testify (R. 2239). Mr. Mickelson carefully explained
to defendant "what would happen when the prosecutor cross-examined
him" and defendant agreed to take the stand (R. 2240) .
Defendant testified that a car crowded him out of his lane,
forcing him into the emergency lane in order to avoid being hit (R.
1944-45).

He claimed that as he was checking his blind spot and

mirrors, he looked up and saw "some movementw and "swerved to the
lane of travel and there was, I don't know, an impact" (R. 1946) .
Obviously,

a

sound

tactical

reason

underlay

counsel's

recommendation. ££. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Defendant does not suggest
any plausible defense that unconf licted counsel could have mounted
without the use of defendant's testimony or that held the promise
of a better result for defendant. ££. id-

In sum, the decision

that defendant testify was "made for any number of legitimate tactical
reasons." State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah App. 1996),
Mr. Mickelson's decision was not prompted by a desire to favor
another at the client's expense. ££. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Far
from benefitting the clubs, as defendant now suggests, calling
defendant to testify had if anything the potential to harm Mr.
Mickelson's family businesses (R. 2243) . In the rule 23B hearing,
Mr. Mickelson testified:
Prior to Paul • s testimony, I don11 think anybody knew where
Paul had been drinking at, and therefore, putting him on
the stand and in a potential cross-examination, I believed
that the prosecutor . . . would inquire where he'd been
12

(• • .continued)
P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980) (discussing sudden emergency
doctrine).
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drinking, how much he drank, so to do so would be adversely
against the interest of . . . Charlie1s and Bart f s.
(R. 2243).

Mr. Mickelson concluded at trial that his belief was

correct, because "when Paul testified on the stand as to where he
had been, every investigator for the County Attorney • s Office sitting
in this courtroom picked up theit

cell phones and made calls

immediately to find out about those places" (R. 2244) .
Defendant argues that his trial testimony, "while favorable
to Mr. Mickelson's

drinking establishments, was subjected to

devastating rebuttal."

Br. Aplt. at 20.

On the contrary, as Mr.

Mickelson testified without contradiction, defendant's best defense
at trial was to explain why he was in the emergency lane, and his
only means of establishing that defense was to take the stand.
Defendant correctly asserts that his testimony opened the door
to rebuttal testimony that defendant told a physician, "I was driving
drunk and I killed a kid."

see Br. Aplt. at 20 (citing R. 1823) .

However, two witnesses had already testified that, en route to the
hospital, defendant repeated, "Oh my God, I killed somebody" two
or three times (R. 1177; see also R. 731) . And with a blood alcohol
level of .27, there was no question that defendant was driving drunk.
Considering the lack of plausible alternatives and the potential
harm to the clubs, Mr. Mickelson's advice to defendant to take the
stand proves only that counsel acted in defendant's best interest
without regard to any impact on the clubs.
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3.

Counsel called a bartender who testified that she
served defendant alcohol at Charlie's Club.

Defendant argues that Mr. Mickelson breached his duty of loyalty
to defendant because he "failed to investigate possible wrongdoing
by the clubs and their employees. " Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant claims
that the reason for this conduct is wobvious: Mr. Mickelson did not
want to find anything that would point to liability on the part of
the clubs# their managers, officers and agents." id.
This argument ignores the trial record. According to defendantf s
testimony, his last stop before the 1 March 1994 homicide was
Charlie's Club (R.

1952-53).

He testified that after consuming

two drinks there he "didn't feel intoxicated" and that his responses
and perceptions were normal (R. 1953-56) . To corroborate defendant's
testimony, Mr. Mickelson called Gloria Anderson, the Charlie's Club
employee who waited on defendant that evening (R. 1641-42). Ms.
Anderson, who had been formally trained to determine when someone
was intoxicated, testified that when defendant left the club he did
not appear to be intoxicated (R. 1640-43).
Moreover, no competent defense lawyer would have introduced
evidence of "wrongdoing by the clubs and their employees. " Testimony
that the clubs continued to serve defendant alcohol after he was
obviously intoxicated would have buttressed the State' s claim that
defendant was too intoxicated to drive safely.
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4.

Three incidental references to counsel's father
at trial were insignificant.

Defendant points to three incidental references to Doug Mickelson
in the trial testimony of defendant and Gloria Anderson as evidence
of an adverse effect on counsel's trial performance. Br. Aplt. at
25-26 (citing R. 1951-53, 1649, 1655). These references, he argues,
may have suggested to the jury that counsel and client were "somehow
in cahoots," thereby undermining Mr. Mickelson's credibility. Id.
at 26.
In the context of a trial record of nearly 2,000 pages, the
references of which defendant complains were insignificant.

No

connection was ever drawn between Doug and James Mickelson; Doug
was mentioned only in passing as the person defendant was looking
for in the bars; Mickelson is a common enough name that the identity
of names might have been coincidental; and, considering the nature
of the charge, it is unlikely that the jury would have attributed
any criminal involvement to counsel. If the jury noticed the name
and speculated on it, the most likely inference is wholly innocent:
defendant hired his friend's son to represent him.
5.

Counsel actively advocated for defendant at trial .

The trial record as a whole refutes defendant's claim of adverse
impact.

Counsel was no potted plant.

He objected during the

prosecutors' direct examinations (see, e.g.. R. 1245-47, 1295, 130608, 1315-16, 1505, 1507, 1509), including a "vigorous objection"
to a critical question asked of defendant on cross-examination
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(R. 1631) ; he cross-examined prosecution witnesses thoroughly (see,
e.g. . R. 1347-63, 1418-88, 1543-82); he introduced 19 exhibits (R.
297-98) ; he pursued, mid-trial, a suggestion of juror bias (R. 207695) ; he credibly argued for dismissal of the charges at the conclusion
of the State's case (R. 1610-13); he gave an extensive opening
statement at the outset of the defense case (R. 1617-29) ; he called
several witnesses, including an accident reconstructionist (R. 165659, 1783) ; he gave a lengthy closing argument that was as persuasive
as the facts of the case permitted (R. 1883-1917) ; and he preserved
the search issue that defendant now urges on appeal (R. 445-50).
But the clearest proof that Mr. Mickelson was not affected by
his connection to the clubs is that he affirmatively exposed their
identities by calling defendant testify (see R. 1943-44, 1949-53) .
If any conflict of loyalty did exist, counsel resolved it in favor
of defendant at the clubs1 expense.
D.

State v. Johnson is easily distinguishable.

Defendant relies on State v. Johnson. Br. Aplt. at 15-17, 21-22,
24-25. As the lone Utah case of a criminal defense attorney charged
with a conflict between his client's interest and his own, Johnson
seems relevant. However, it is readily distinguishable.
Attorney Joseph Bottum represented Johnson against a securities
fraud charge. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 486. The State had information
that Bottum had substantial knowledge of, and had directly
participated in, one of the transactions at issue. 13. It intended
to present this evidence at trial, and possibly call Bottum as a
witness. Id. The State brought this matter before the trial court.
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Id.

Bottum denied all involvement and repeatedly stated that he

"was at a loss to understand what they're talking about." id. at
487, At trial, the State's chief witness explained the fraudulent
stock scheme and Bottumfs role in it. Id.
This Court held that, because "Bottum was implicated as a
coconspirator,,f he "had an interest in exonerating himself which
was not consistent with defending his client.11 I£. at 490. Also,
his integrity and credibility as defense counsel were eroded by the
accusations.

ifl.

Hence, Bottum failed to call defendant as a

witness, failed to call himself as a witness, and failed to object
to the prosecutor's closing argument.

1£. at 490, 490 n.3. The

court therefore found a Sixth Amendment violation.

Xs|. at 491.

In contrast, Mr. Mickelson here had no personal knowledge
(substantial or otherwise) of the facts underlying the charges; did
not conspire with his client to commit any crime; did not misrepresent
the level of his involvement to the court; had no testimony to
contribute at trial; had no criminal exposure; was not discredited
before the jury by accusations of complicity; did not inadequately
cross-examine any prosecution witness; did not silence his client
for fear of implicating himself; and did not fail to object to
prosecutor comments in closing.
Defendant has not demonstrated that his lawyer "actively
represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 392 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, his Sixth Amendment claim fails.
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POINT II
BECAUSE DEPENDANT WAS LAWFULLY ARRESTED FOR DRUNK DRIVING,
THE CONTINUOUS DISSIPATION OF HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CREATED
AN EXIGENCY JUSTIFYING THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW
Defendant claims that, because police did not attempt to obtain
a telephonic warrant before drawing his blood, the trial court erred
in finding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement applied.

Br. Aplt. at 28-29.

Pursuant to Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App.
1994) , the trial court concluded that "destruction of blood alcohol
evidence can constitute an exigent circumstance," and that "the
officer is not required to show an inability to obtain a telephonic
search warrant in addition to demonstration of exigent circumstances"
(R. 174). £g£ Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1990) .
The court found that Trooper Peterson "was properly concernedabout the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible loss or
corruption of that evidence, that time was critical in obtaining
evidence of blood alcohol level, that the offense was serious and
that the exigent circumstances obviated the need to obtain a search
warrant" and "that there was no evidence before the Court that a
magistrate with the proper equipment as required by Utah law was
available and prepared to do a telephonic search warrant" (R. 174-75) .
A.

Dissipation of blood alcohol satisfies the exigency
requirement for a warrantless blood draw in this
context.

"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and
seizures, only those that are unreasonable." Skinner v. Ry. Labor
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Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citations omitted).
"What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself."
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez. 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)
(citations omitted) . Thus, the constitutionality of government action
"is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."

Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 654 (1979).

In most criminal cases, this balance is struck "in favor of
the procedures described by tha Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment."

Skinner. 489 U.S. at 619.

However, courts have

recognized exceptions to this rule "when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable." J&.

(citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).
"When faced with such special needs, [the Court has] not hesitated
to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the
particular context." JjJ, Examples include post-accident blood tests
of railway workers, !£. at 624, sobriety checkpoints, Michigan Deot.
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), life-threatening
emergencies, Warden yf Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967), and blood
tests of drunk drivers, Schmerberv. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) .
" [T]he intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant."
Skinner. 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 771).
Nevertheless, "compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be
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analyzed for alcohol content" plainly constitute searches and seizures
for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68.

Therefore, a warrant is required unless an exception to the general
warrant requirement applies.

Schmerber itself, which carves out

such an exception, controls this case.
Schmerber was charged with driving under the influence.
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 758. His blood was drawn without his consent,
and Schmerber objected to its admission on various constitutional
grounds. i£. at 759. All were ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court. 2$i. at 760 (due process) , 765 (self-incrimination), 766 (right
to counsel), 772 (unlawful searches and seizures).
In concluding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the
Court relied upon four main factors: (1) probable cause existed to
arrest Schmerber, and he was in fact arrested; (2) a blood test was
likely to produce evidence of intoxication; (3) dissipation of blood
alcohol created an exigent circumstance; and (4) the blood draw was
performed in a reasonable manner,

id- at 768-72.

Defendant concedes factors (1) , (2) , and (4), arguing only that
the circumstances here were not sufficiently exigent tc permit the
officer to proceed without a warrant.

Br. Aplt. at 26.

Although no Utah case addresses this precise issue, many courts
have held that dissipation of alcohol from a suspect's bloodstream,
without more, establishes exigent circumstances in the context of
drunk driving, £££, e.g.. United States Y, Rgjfl, 929 F.2d 990, 994
(4th Cir. 1991) (exigent circumstances were established by societal
interest in protecting against drunk drivers, use of less intrusive
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breathalyzer test, and urgency when testing for alcohol) ; Carleton
v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 890, 891 (Cal. App. 1985), (societal
interest in obtaining blood samples as soon as possible creates
"emergency"); State v. Baker. 502 A.2d 489, 493 (Me. 1985) ("[t]he
bodily process

that

eliminates alcohol

also provides exigent

circumstances obviating the need to obtain a warrant prior to
administering a blood test") ; Gregg v. State. 374 So.2d 1301, 1303-04
(Miss. 1979) (dissipation of blood alcohol constituted an "emergency,"
which, coupled with a lawful arrest, permitted police to test
suspect's blood without a warrant); State v. Bohling. 494 N.W.2d
399, 4 02 (Wis. 1993) ("the dissipation of alcohol from a person's
blood

stream

constitutes

a sufficient

exigency

to justify a

warrantless blood draw"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 836 (1993).
This rule recognizes that, unlike a suspect's blood type, see
State v. Carter. 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (N.C. 1988),

or HIV status,

see Barlow v. Ground. 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991), cert,
denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992) , evidence of a suspect's blood alcohol
concentration is evanescent.

Nor can police secure the premises

in order to freeze the status quo while a warrant is sought.
Seaura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796 (1984) .

See

The clock keeps

ticking. Indeed, the circumstances in a case of this type are even
more exigent than in the usual destruction-of-evidence cases, "since
alcohol in a suspect's blood is certain to disappear" whereas
ordinarily physical evidence is "only very likely to disappear while
a search warrant [is] obtained."
1345 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
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State v. Cocio. 709 P.2d 1336,

Underlying policy interests strongly support such a per se rule
in drunk driving cases. "Drunk driving is a grave problem in society
today." United States v. Reid. 929 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly lamented the tragedy. " South Dakota
v. Neville. 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) . "No one can seriously dispute
the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the states • interest
in eradicating it.

Media reports of alcohol-related deaths and

mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion." Michigan State Police
Yt SitS, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
Conversely, "the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not
significant, since such tests are a commonplace in these days of
periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that tot most people
the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. " Skinner.
489 U.S. at 624 (quoting Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 771).
Finally, "[d]elay in obtaining a blood sample also creates
potential problems for drunk-driving defendants. " Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d
at 406.

This is so because "a person's [blood alcohol] level

initially rises for a period of time after drinking stops while
alcohol is being absorbed."

Id.

In sum, defendant's intoxicated state, and the consequent
inexorable dissipation of blood alcohol evidence, without more,
satisfies Schmerber's exigency requirement.13
13

An additional but not required factor was also present
here. Where a search occurs in the suspected drunk driver's
home, "an important factor to be considered when determining
(continued...)
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B.

This Court has repeatedly refused to require the State
to show unavailability of a telephonic warrant in order
to establish exigent circumstances.

Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in finding exigent
circumstances absent proof that a telephonic warrant was unavailable.
Br. Aplt. at 38. Defendant cites no cases, and the State is aware
of none, holding that the unavailability of a telephonic warrant
is necessary to a finding of exigency in drunk driving case.14

13

(. . .continued)
whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying
offense for which the arrest is being made.11 Welsh v. Wisconsin.
466 U.S. 740, 758 (1984) (warrantless home entry to obtain
evidence of noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no
imprisonment is possible was unreasonable). Accord Citv of Orem
v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1392 (Utah App. 1994) (warrantless home
entry to obtain evidence of driving under the influence, a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment and fine, was reasonable).
Defendant here was suspected of driving under the influence
and, if the accident victim died, automobile homicide (R. 419-20,
430, 436) .
14

Defendant cites numerous federal cases to the effect that
exigent circumstances will not be found absent a good faith
attempt to obtain a telephonic warrant. Br. Aplt. at 35. These
cases differ from the case at bar in critical ways: none involves
a blood test, an intoxicated driver, or a homicide; none
discusses Schmerber: and all rely on rule 41(c)(2), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. £££ United States v. Tarazon. 989 F.2d
1045, 1050 (9 Cir.) (drug search of auto service
establishment), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 853 (1993); United States
v. Talkinaton. 843 F.2d 1041,1047 (7th Cir. 1988) (search of home
for counterfeit money); United States v. Manfredi. 722 F.2d 519,
522 (9th Cir. 1983) (drug search of hotel room); United States v.
fcerisli, 710 F.2d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir.) (drug search of mobile
home), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 899 (1983); United States v.
Cuaron. 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983) (drug search of a
residence); United States V. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (weapons search of apartment).
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court cited two of the
foregoing cases, Manfredi and McEachin. for the proposition that
••proof of the unavailability of a telephone warrant is not
required when the exigency is so immediate or great that it
(continued...)
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In Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), this
Court rejected the telephonic warrant requirement for which defendant
argues.

Henrie was convicted of driving under the influence and

leaving the scene of an accident. Henrie, 868 P. 2d at 1385. Police
found her car at a fourplex with front-end damage, parked at an
extreme angle with the door ajar, and smelling strongly of alcohol.
Id. Officers entered Henrie1 s apartment, administered field sobriety
tests, and attempted without success to administer an intoxilyzer
test.

Id- at 1386.

Henrie attempted to suppress all evidence

gathered by police after entering her apartment. Id- at 1386 n.3.
In affirming the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances,
the Henrie court found that w[t]he police were properly concerned
about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible loss or
corruption of that evidence; time is critical in obtaining evidence
of blood or breath alcohol level; the offense in question was serious
in nature, punishable by incarceration and a fine; [and] the police
acted reasonably and conducted a model, continuous, and ongoing
investigation . . . " Id- at 1393. Additional factors cited by the
Court related to the fact that Henrie fled the scene of an accident
into her home, where the search in question occurred.

See id.

Henrie argued that "police could have obtained telephonic warrant
'in minutes' and therefore should have done so." Id. at 1392. She
argued further that police had two hours in which to obtain the

14

(.. .continued)
precludes recourse to any warrant procedures." State v. Ashe,745
P.2d 1255, 1267 n.61 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
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warrant, relying on the statutory presumption that a blood test taken
within two hours of an accident indicates the suspect's blood alcohol
level at the time of the accident.

I£. (citing Utah Code Ann. §

41-6-44 (a) (i) (1993)) . The Court read this argument as a suggestion
•'that the police were required to exhaust the two hours in procuring
a warrant."

I£. at 1392-93. This is defendant's argument here.

This Court rejected Henrie's suggestion. While conceding that
"the police could have sought a telephonic warrant within that first
hour," the Court reiterated that it had "previously declined the
invitation to require a showing of inability to obtain a telephonic
warrant in addition to a demonstration of exigent circumstances."
Id. at 1393 (citing State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 n.l (Utah
App. 1991)). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) .15

15

Ashe involved evidence discovered by the police who,
after kicking in the door of a drug suspect's residence, secured
the home while obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 1257. Ashe
argued that "the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress since no attempt was made by the officers to obtain a
telephone warrant." Id- at 1267. The supreme court wrote:
While we do not decide whether the prosecution has the
burden of proving the unavailability of a state
telephone warrant in order to demonstrate sufficient
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search,
numerous federal cases hold that proof of the
unavailability of a telephone warrant is not required
when the exigency is so immediate or great that it
precludes recourse to any warrant procedures.
Id- The court upheld the search. Because the police "had
substantial cause to believe that destruction of evidence would
occur before they could obtain a search warrant," the court
wrote, "the time required to obtain a telephone warrant, however
brief, was not available." Id.
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The Henrie court stressed that "where investigations of alcoholrelated offenses involve a search or arrest in a defendant's home,
courts have been more reluctant to find exigent circumstances,
particularly if the alcohol-related offense is minor.w Id. at 1389.
In contrast, the instant case did not involve a home search. And
in comparison to the misdemeanor at issue in Henrie. the offense -a potential second degree felony automobile homicide -- certainly
was not minor. Accordingly, under Henrie. the State was a fortiori
not required to establish the unavailability of a warrant.
Other courts agree that, in a Schmerber-type factual setting,
the existence of a telephonic warrant procedure "does not alter the
exigency of the situation."

EfiisL 929 F.2d at 993; Carlton, 216

Cal. Rptr. at 891 (over dissent arguing for telephonic warrant, see
216 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (Staniforth, Acting P.J., dissenting));
Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d at 399, 404 (over dissent arguing for telephonic
warrant, see 494 N.W.2d at 408 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)).
In view of Henrie and precedents from other jurisdictions
involving non-residential drunk driving searches, the trial court
correctly analed that proof of the unavailability of a telephonic
warrant was not necessary to a finding of exigent circumstances.
C

The two-hour presumption and the .08 legal limit are
irrelevant to this case.

Defendant argues in effect that his own extreme drunkenness,
coupled with the two-hour statutory presumption, defeats the courtf s
finding of exigent circumstances. His argument proceeds as follows:
(1) the law forbids a person to drive with a blood alcohol level
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of .08 or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after driving, sge Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(1) (a) (i) (1993) ;16 (2)
defendant was so obviously drunk (his blood alcohol level turned
out to be .27) that, given the rate at which alcohol metabolizes,
there was no danger that it would drop below .08 in two hours; (3)
defendant was arrested 30 minutes into the two-hour window; therefore,
(4) the state had sufficient time, 90 minutes, to obtain a search
warrant. Br. Aplt. at 28-38. This argument proceeds on a number
of faulty premises.
First, it assumes that degrees of drunkenness over the legal
limit of .08

did not matter at trial.

This is incorrect.

In order to convict defendant of a second degree felony as
charged, the State was required to prove both that defendant was
driving while legally intoxicated and that he was "operating the
motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner."

Utah Code Ann*

§ 76-5-207(2) (a) (Supp. 1993). Sea also Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (4)
(1990) (defining criminal negligence) . The jury was also instructed
on the elements of third degree felony automobile homicide (R. 204-06,
214, 217) . The crime is identical except that the requisite mental
state is simple, rather than criminal, negligence. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (a) (Supp. 1993).

16

A test taken more than two hours later "is admissible as
evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the
time of the alleged [driving], but the trier of fact shall
determine what weight is given to the result of the test." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1993).
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The outcome of this case lay in the gap between simple and
criminal negligence. Defense counsel argued to the jury, "I'm not
going to try to tell you that Paul Bredehof t was not simply negligent.
He may have been simply negligent. But if you do not find that he
was criminal negligent . . . then you must look to the lower offenses"
(R. 1916-17).

Prosecutors relied on the degree of defendant's

drunkenness as evidence of criminal negligence in arguing the case
to the jury:

w

the jury instructions tell you that level of

intoxication is something you can consider in considering criminal
negligence. And someone who was two and a half times the legal limit
in terms of blood alcohol is certainly something that should be
considered" (R. 1919) . The jury was also instructed "that you may
consider the degree of the defendant's intoxication or the amount
of alcohol consumed by the defendant as factors in determining whether
the defendant was criminally negligent

. . . " (R. 211). See Utah

Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1990).
Thus, not merely the fact that defendant was intoxicated, but
also the degree of his intoxication, was crucial at trial.
Second, defendant's argument misreads section 41-6-44 (1) (a) (i)
(1993) (see addendum A) . Defendant "seems to suggest that the police
were required to exhaust the two hours in procuring a warrant."
Henrie. 868 P.2d 1393.
rejected

As noted above, this Court has already

this reading of the statute.

A

"more compelling

interpretation of the statutory scheme is that it evinces the
Legislature's intent to-promote the rapid attainment of chemical
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tests for alcohol content," since "tests given more than two hours
after an incident may be afforded different weight, presumably less,
than those administered within two hours." Id- 1393 n.10. Thus,
the two-hour window is intended to expedite, not delay, blood tests.17
Third, defendant's assertion that "a telephonic warrant could
have been obtained in the 90 minutes that Trooper Peterson had after
placing Mr. Bredehoft under arrest," Br. Aplt. at 38, relies on a
misreading of State v. Lopez. 676 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1984).
Defendant claims that in Lopez "it took only 24 minutes to obtain
a telephonic search warrant." Br. Aplt. at 32-33. However, a careful
reading of the case suggests that 24 minutes was in fact the time
spent on the telephone with the magistrate.18

The period between

when the police developed probable cause (4:00 p.m.) and when they
called the magistrate (5:40 p.m.) was an hour and forty minutes.
Lopez at 395. The entire process thus consumed two hours and four
minutes. Accordingly, to the extent that Lopez bears on the instant

The two-hour presumption may serve other purposes as
well. Without it, a defendant might argue that a blood test
taken one hour after driving showed an erroneously high blood
alcohol level on the theory that he drove so soon after drinking
that the alcohol had not yet reached his blood stream.
18

This reading is confirmed by the fact that the court
cited the 24-minute figure to supports its prediction that
neither magistrates nor "[b]usy prosecutors and law enforcement
personnel11 would overuse the telephonic warrant process, "since
the added formalities, including recording and transcription,
will require added time . . ." L2E££# 676 P.2d at 397; see also
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Utah 1987) (noting that
obtaining a telephonic warrant requires more than "a simple phone
call" and "can take significant time").
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case, it demonstrates that obtaining a warrant within the statutory
two-hour period was not possible,19
* * *

In view of the foregoing, the trial court correctly determined
that the dissipation of defendant » s blood alcohol created an exigency
justifying a warrantless search.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S SECTION 77-17-13 CHALLENGE TO DR. RAY
MIDDLBTON'S TESTIMONY IS NOT PRESERVED BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS BELOW DID NOT CLEARLY AND SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY
THAT GROUND
Defendant objected to the testimony of two different expert
witnesses; only one is at issue on appeal.
Trooper Zdunich. Defendant objected to the testimony of Trooper
Zdunich on the ground that he had not received 30-days notice of
the testimony as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1990) (R.
1093, 1101) . Prosecutors proffered that Trooper Zdunich would testify
as to "the effects of alcohol on human physiology; that is, how it
impairs a person's ability to function well and drive a motor vehicle"
(R. 1095).

Defendant's objection was taken under advisement (R.

1111-12) and Trooper Zdunich did not testify in the prosecution case
in chief.

19

In view of the foregoing discussion, defendant's claim
that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the blood draw
occurred at 8:20 p.m. rather than 8:18 p.m.# Br. Aplt. at 27-28,
is irrelevant.
44

The trooper was allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness in
response to defense testimony (R. 1827) . Trooper Zdunich testified
that a blood alcohol level of .27 will impair judgment, coordination,
and balance; lower inhibitions; increase risk-taking; cause blurred
or double vision; slow the system; and causes fatigue, vomiting,
and incontinence (R. 1844-46). Defendant does not contest this
testimony on appeal.

See Br. Aplt. at 39-43.

Dr. Middleton. On appeal, defendant attacks the admission of
the testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton, a physician. He argues that
Dr. Middleton1 s testimony concerning the effect of a .27 blood alcohol
level should have been excluded under section 77-17-13, which requires
3 0-days advance notice before calling expert witnesses.

See Br.

Aplt. at 39, 43. However, because defendant failed to articulate
that ground for his objection at trial, this issue is not preserved
for appellate review.
In order to show defendant's grossly negligent state of mind,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990) , the prosecution called Dr.
Middleton, who teaches about the effects of alcohol use in the
Dayspring Program, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program defendant
attended in 1987 (R. 1236-40).
Dr. Middleton testified concerning his 44-lecture Dayspring
seminar, including the effects of alcohol on the nervous system and
on coordination (R. 1242-49) . In the course of this testimony, Dr.
Middleton testified that the fine motor coordination of a person
with a blood alcohol content of .27 would be very much impaired,
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and that many people would be approaching a comatose state (R. 124 8) .
Dr. Middleton also testified that, as part of his program, he covers
the effects of alcohol upon a person, including, from time to time,
examples based on different alcohol levels (R. 1249) .
Defendant objected repeatedly to Dr. Middleton's testimony
concerning the effects of a .27 blood alcohol level (R. 1245-50,
addendum E).

For example:

Q (By Mr. Ybarra) The next question would be, then,
what would you anticipate the effect of such a concentration
upon a person's coordination?
MR. MICKELSON: Objection, your Honor, again rule on
expert witnesses.
THE COURT: This is not an expert witness as such.
This is asking based upon the qualification, experience,
and expertise that this individual possesses and it does
not fall within -MR. MICKELSON: They [sic] it goes to foundation, then,
as to ability of this witness to testify as an expert expert in that area, the effects of alcohol on the system
with that kind of level of blood alcohol.
THE COURT: If it's just a foundation objection, then,
I think that foundation has been established . . . any other
objection?
MR. MICKELSON: Is the State's motion to move to have
him qualified as an expert in this area?
THE COURT: I haven't heard anything in [sic] that
extent.
MR. MICKELSON: There's still lack of qualifying this
witness as an expert before we can proceed in this area.
THE COURT: In some jurisdictions there may be a need
to have a witness to be designated as such and have the
court accept them. In this jurisdiction it's based upon
the training qualification. I would inform the jury they're
not bound by any testimony and it's dependent upon what
they consider the.educational requirements, experience,
et cetera of a witness to either accept or reject their
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testimony. And that would be my instruction to the jury
at the appropriate time.
MR. MICKELSON: Thank you, your Honor. Again I renew
my objection, again, under the rules on expert witnesses,
and I believe they have crossed the line on that area, would
ask the Court to follow the statute on expert witnesses
at this point.
THE COURT: I understand.
Thank youAnd as I
understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this
witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27 upon
an individual based upon his training in the area and
experience and expertise. Is that correct, Mr. -MR. YBARRA: That is correct.
THE COURT: -- Ybarra?

Thank you.

MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, as I understand that calls
for an expert opinion at this point in time, again the £-: r.e
THE COURT: Okay. And maybe you have misunderstood
me, Mr. Mickelson. It's not necessary for the State to
ask me to accredit or to designate anybody as an expert
witness. That will be part of the instructions that I am
going to give to the jury, and it's going to be up to the
jury as to whether or not they accept that person, based
on foundation or not.
I have ruled that foundation is established. And it's
not necessary for the State to request of me, nor is it
necessary for me to designate this witness or any other
witness to be an expert.
MR. MICKELSON: I understand t.\ - , your Honor, and I
accept that part of it. At this point in time they are
moving over into the expert opinion area with this witness
and he was not designated as an expert witness to testify
on the effects of -THE COURT: Your objection is noted.
(R. 1245-47).

At no point during Dr. Middleton's testimony did

defense counsel cite section 7-17-13, mention the 30-day time limit,
claim surprise, or otherwise clarify the basis of his objection.
His cryptic references to the "statute on experts" or the "rule on
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expert witnesses" suggest that he may have been thinking of section
77-17-13 as he objected.

However, it is clear from the court's

responses that it never understood the objections to rely on the
notice requirements of section 77-17-13. Rather, the court reasonably
understood defendant's objections to go to foundation or to the
failure to "designate" Dr. Middleton as an expert.
The trial court was not being obtuse. When counsel objected
to a subsequent witness's testimony on the ground that the
"prosecution failed to disclose they were getting in this line of
questioning with their witness" (R. 1369) , the trial court correctly
understood the objection as grounded upon section 77-17-13,
paraphrasing it as follows: "Mr. Mickelson, the basis for your
objection is that in the attempt of the State to comply with the
expert witness notice requirement, they did not put down that Sergeant
Middaugh is going to be testifying as to the effects of alcohol upon
someone" (1372) . In fact, the trial court sustained this objection,
ruling that the prosecutor could not question the witness "as to
the effects of alcohol of a B.A. level of .27 upon an individual"
(R.

1376-77) .20
"Trial counsel must state clearly and specifically all grounds

for objection."

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 13363 n.12 (Utah

1993) (emphasis added). Otherwise, "that issue is not properly
preserved for appeal." Id- &2£££d In re Estate Of Jwetheim, 824

2

The trial court overruled a similar objection raised by
the State against defendant's accident reconstructionist (R.
1712-13).
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P.2d 432, 434-35 (Utah App. 1991) ("[i]n order to complain of the
admission of evidence, there must be a clear and definite objection
stating the grounds therefor").

The objection must "be specific

enough to give the trial court notice of the very error11 complained
of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co. . 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah
App. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Beehive Medical Elec. Inc.
v- Square DCo.. 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)).
"The purpose of requiring a properly presented objection is
to 'put the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the
proceedings.1" State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993)
(quoting Brobercr v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) (per
curiam)).
Trial counsel's objections here did not afford the trial court
that opportunity. They did not identify clearly and specifically
"the very error" complained of on appeal: that the State had failed
to give defendant notice of the challenged testimony as required
by section 77-17-13.

Accordingly, this claim of error is not

preserved and the issue is not properly before this Court.21

21

The challenged testimony was cumulative in any event. In
addition to the testimony of Trooper Zdunich summarized above,
Trooper Peterson testified to the characteristics of persons with
a .27 blood alcohol content (R. 1259-60).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ -

gjgjgSnib'er 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

)ROS,
sistant Attorney General
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following:
Robert K. Heineman
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

32A-12-103. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another.
In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2 of the Utah Criminal Code relating
to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, the following principles
apply to violations of this title:
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by any person in the employ
of the occupant of any premises in which the offense is committed, or by
any person who is required by the occupant to be or remain in or upon the
premises, or to act in any way for the occupant, the occupant is prima facie
considered a party to the offense committed, and is liable as a principal
offender, notwithstanding the fact that the offense was committed by a
person who is not proved to have committed it under or by the direction of
the occupant Nothing in this section relieves the person actually committing the offensefromliability.
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a corporation or association, the officer or agent of the corporation or association in charge of the
premises in which the offense is committed is prima facie considered a
party to the offense committed, and is personally liable to the penalties
prescribed for the offense as a principal offender. Nothing in this section
relieves the corporation or association or the person who actually committed the offensefromliability.

32A-12-204. Unlawful sale or supply to intoxicated persons.
A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any
alcoholic beverage or product to any person who is apparently under the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or to a person
whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have
knownfromthe circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs.

82A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribution of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action —
Statute of limitations — Employee protections.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the
Mowing persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person,
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from
the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 years;
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs;
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew
or should have knownfromthe circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person.
(2) An employer is liableforthe actions of its employees in violation of this
chapter*
(3) A person who suffers an iiyury under Subsection (1) has a cause of action
against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1).
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under thi* chapter that arises after July 1,1985
ii limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury.
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the iiyury,
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent
judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection (1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is sufcgect to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Title 34, Chapter 35, the Utah Antidiacriminatory Act

76-5-207. Automobile h o m i c i d e .
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, •negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent
manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).

77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing,
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of thr expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases u d reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when
available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any
rebuttal expert when available.
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part
of any party or attorney; the court shall impose appropriate sanctions.

77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses —
Witness not in physical presence of magistrate —
Duplicate original warrants — Return.
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence of an
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a
person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided the
magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and transcribed.
After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the magistrate and
filed with the court This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for
purposes of this section.
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those required by this chapter. Prior to
issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the law enforcement
officer or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read
to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct
that specific modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting
attorney for the government who is requesting the warrant to sign the
magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be called a duplicate original warrant and shall be deemed a warrant for purposes of this
chapter. In such cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an original
warrant The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the
duplicate original warrant on the face of the original warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original warrant
shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate
shall require the person who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing
the grounds for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of
license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon afirstconviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours nor more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational aeries at a licensed alcohol or dirug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1,1993, the court may
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction lor a violation committed within six years
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive
hours nor more than 720 hours.
(b) Hie court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work
in a commimity-eervice work program for not less than 80 hours nor more
than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.

(6) (a) A third convictionfora violation committed within six years of two
prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and
(7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for
violations committed after April 23, 1990.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence
impoee a mandatory Jail sentence of not leas than 720 nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-eervice work programfornot less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-eervice work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court ahall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-eervice work programfornot less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term
closely supervised follow through after the treatment
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-eervice work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony
if at least three prior convictions areforviolations committed after April
23, 1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose afineof not less than
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours
nor mors than 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
eentenec.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drag dependency
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow through after the treatment
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court ahall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.

(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole
or probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been
served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation
under this section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after
July 1, 1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4)9 (6), (6), and (7) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the court,
treatment at an alcohol or urug dependency rehabilitation facility;
obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, apply to
a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior
conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) H e court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court would render in connection with applying
respectively, thefirst,second, or subsequent conviction requirements
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) Tlie statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-645 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for
the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), knd
(7).

(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a personfora violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the
operator's license of any person convicted for thefirsttime under Subsection (1), and shall revokefarone year the license of any person convicted
of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtractfromany suspension or revocation
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended
under Section 41*2*130, if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions
for driving under the influence — Weight of evidence.
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10
does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is
given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
BLOOD SAMPLES AND
RESULTS

vs.
Case No. 941900500 FS
PAUL GUY BREDEBOFT,
Judge Glenn X. Iwasaki
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Paul Guy Bredehoft, by and through
his attorney of record, James D. Mickelson, and moves this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-(12) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, to suppress all evidence regarding the blood
samples, an any and all evidence results regarding the analyzing
of blood taken from the Defendant for purposes of determining
alcohol and/or drug content concentration by the Plaintiff,
through its agents and associates.
This motion is made on the grounds that all evidence that the
Defendant request be suppressed was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and art. 1 Sec. 14 of

000117

the Utah States Constitution, in that the arresting officer,
Trooper Peterson, did not have consent or other lawful
justifications for taking the blood of the Defendant and having it
analyzed.
STATEMENT OP PACTS
The facts will be presented to the Court by oral testimony of
the subpoenaed witnesses.
POIWTS Jjflp AUTHORITIES
POZHT Z

THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OP ESTABLISHING THAT THE SEARCH OP
THE DEFENDANT HAS LAWFUL.
It is a well-established principal that obtaining a blood
sample from a Defendant is a search for purposes of Fourth
Amendment protections. See gghjf^rfcfr y. California. 384 U.S. 757,
86 S Ct 1826.
Further the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Chrlstensen. 676
P.2d 408 (Utah 1984) has held that where no warrant has been
issued, the state has the burden of showing that the search was
lawful.
POINT ZZ
EVIDENCE OP THE BLOOD TEST AID ZTS RESULTS SHOULD BE
SUPPRESSED FOR FAILURE OP THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO INFORM THE
DEFENDANT OP THE PURPOSE AMD OIVE THE DEFENDANT AH
OPPORTUNITY TO DECLINE THE TESTS
In the instant case, it is the Defendant's contention that he
was not given the opportunity to decline the talcing of blood
-2-

ooom

samples by Bryon Davis, of Salt Lake County, at the direction of
the arresting Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Peterson.
The Defendant concedes that under Utah Code Ann. Section
41-6-44.10 that he has given implied consent to chemical tests as
a result of operating an automobile upon the highways of the State
of Utah so long as the test is at the direction of a police
officer having ground to believe that the Defendant was operating
an automobile or having a blood or breath content above the
statutory prohibitive amount.
However, it is the Defendant's contention that he must be
made clearly aware that any chemical blood or breath tests is
being taken for the purposes of investigating the suspicion of
driving under the influence. Th*s proposition is supported in the
case of State v. Cruz. 446 P.2d *07, 309 (Utah 1968) wherein the
Court, in deciding the applicability of the implied consent
statute first held that it only applies after arrest, and
secondly, held that the arrested person is only then compelled to
elect whether he will submit to a test or lose the license.
In fact, under Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.10, the
legislature adopted a language indicating that there must be a
request to submit to a test by a police officer before sanctions
apply.

-3-
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The relevant portion of the statute is set forth in
subsection 2(a):
If the person has been placed under arrest has then been
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of
the chemical tests under subsection (1), and refuses to
submit to any chemical tests requested, the person shall be
warned by the police officer requesting the test or tests,
that a refusal to submit to a test or tests can result in
revocation of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle.
The statutory scheme under 41-6-44.10 indicates that a request to
take a test is part of the implied consent law*
Further in Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), the
Court, in reviewing an issue regarding confusion over the issuance
of Miranda rights, and the request to take a chemical test, where
the Defendant was unclear as to his legal rights under the
circumstances held that:
fairness and due process require that the person threatened
with the loss of his driver's license should be afforded an
opportunity to make a choice on a fair explanation of his
rights and duties.
It is the Defendant's contention that fairness and due process
require that the police officer not only inform the individual why
he is under arrest, but then inform the Defendant of tests to be
taken and request that his compliance to do so in order to avoid
confusion as to the purposes of any tests and afford the
opportunity to the Defendant to elect his course of conduct.
Finally, it is the Defendant's contention that any blood
tests taken in violation of Utah's implied consent law and its
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results must be suppressed*

In State v. Annen, 504 P.2d 1400 (Or,

App* 1973), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that it was error to
receive evidence in a criminally negligent homicide case of the
results of a blood test taken in violation of the consent
provisions of the Oregon statute.
COBCLU8IOH
In the instant case, the Defendant respectfully submits that
failure of the officer to give the Defendant the opportunity to
decline the test, by informing him of the purpose of the blood
tests being taken, was in contravention of the Utah implied
consent statute and lacked the implied consent of the Defendant
thus, requiring the suppression of the blood tests and its
results.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1994.

'AAS>

& M^-~

!S D. MICKELSON
'Attorney for Defendant

-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF BAND DELIVERY
On the

st

of August 1994, the undersigned sailed a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress Sanples and
Results, postage prepaid, to the following:
Xioberly X. Hornak
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City,~ Utah 84111
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Thfrd Judicial District
DAVID E . YOCOM

WlG 2 0 1994

Salt Lake County Attorney
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK, Bar No. 4341
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
RE: DEFENSE MOTIONS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 941900500FS
PAUL G. BREDEHOFT,
Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki
Defendant.
The above-styled matter came on for hearing on August 15,
1994 as to the following items:
1.

Defendant's motion to suppress the arrest due to lack

of probable cause.
2.

Defendant's motion to suppress blood samples and the

results of the blood alcohol test.
The plaintiff. State of Utah, was represented by Kimberly K.
Hornak.

The defendant was present and represented by James

MiekeIson.

The Court reviewed the legal memoranda presented by

both sides, considered arguments of counsel and otherwise being
fully informed in the premises;
WHEREFORE,

the Court

makes

the following

conclusions:
1.

Motion to Suppress Defendant's Arrest.

findings and

FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS
RE: DEFENSE MOTIONS
Case No. 941900500FS
Page 2

AND

ORDER

The Court finds that under the totality of circumstances
known to Trooper Jeff Peterson that Trooper Peterson had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Ufader the Influence of
Alcohol.

These circumstances include the following observations

noted by Trooper Peterson: an odor of alcohol, slurred speech,
bloodshot eyes, staggering movements when defendant walked, lax
facial muscles.

Further, the defendant stated that he had six

drinks that day, mostly beer.

Defendant also stated that he was

driving the red mustang.
Under the appropriate legal standard stated in Lavton Citv
v. Noon, 736 P.2dl035

(Utah App. 1987), the facts known to

Trooper Peterson were such that a reasonable person in his place
would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed
the

offense

of

Driving

Under

the

Influence

of

Alcohol.

Therefore, Trooper Peterson had probable cause to arrest the
defendant.
2.

Motion to Suppress Blood Samples and Results.

The

Court

finds

that

defendant

has

been

charged

with

Automobile Homicide, Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-207. Subsection
(6) of that section provides that "evidence of a defendant's
blood

• •.

alcohol

content

...

is

admissible

except

prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."
Ann. Section
states that

41-6-44.5(1)(b)
*[i)n a

contains

similar

criminal proceeding,

when

Utah Code

language.

It

noncompliance

with

ooo

FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS
RE: DEFENSE MOTIONS
Case No. 941900500FS
Page 3

AND

ORDER

Section 41-6-44•10 [the implied consent statute] does not render
the results of a chemical test inadmissible.

Evidence of a

defendant's blood ... alcohol content ... is admissible except
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution."
The Courts finds that evidence of the defendant's blood
alcohol content should only be excluded if its admission violates
the rules of evidence or the corstitution.

The Court finds that

under Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 668 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1984) that
destruction of blood alcohol evidence can constitute an exigent
circumstance

and thus, an exception to the Fourth Amendment

requiring a search warrant before evidence is taken.

Further,

Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.5(2) provides for a presumption that a
blood alcohol test is valid if taken within 2 hours of the
defendant's control of the vehicle.
instant

case

the

collision

The Court finds that in the

occurred

at

7:35

p.n;. and that

defendant's blood was taken at 8:20, one hour into the two hour
presumtion of a valid blood alcohol content.
The Court finds that under Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d
1384 (Utah App. 1994) the officer is not required to show an
inability to obtain a telephonic search warrant in addition to a
demonstration of exigent circumstances.
The Court finds that in this case Trooper Jeff Peterson was
properly concerned about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the
possible loss or corruption of that evidence, that time was
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critical in obtaining evidence of blood alcohol level, that the
offense was serious and that the exigent circumstances obviated
the need to obtain a search warrant.

Further, that there was no

evidence before the Court that a magistrate with the proper
equipment as required by Utah law was available and prepared to
do a telephonic search warrant.

Jafaes MiekeIson

"
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct
foregoing

Findings,

Conclusions

copy of the

And

Order

Re: Defense Motions was delivered to James Mickelson, Attorney
for Defendant Paul G. Bredehoft, at 215 South State Street Suite
800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Salt Lake City, Utah
,39

84111 on the

day of August, 1994.
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Addendum D

flUDr-STWCTCCURT
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTatG*J udicial Dtitnrt
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAHf

t

QPJ \ $ |996

Sputyi

FINDINGS OF FACT * —
FROM RULE 23B BEARING

t

Plaintiff,
t

vs.

CASE NO. 941900500FS
CASE NO. 940724-CA

I

PAUL G. BRXDEHOFT,
I

JUdge Glenn X. Iwasaki
Defendant.

t

In September 1994, following a jury trial, defendant was
convicted of criminal automobile homicide, a second degree felony.
On appeal, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. The
matter comes before the Court pursuant to an August 12, 1996 order
of the Utah Court of Appeals (Judge Oxme). The order remands the
case pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B(c), which permits the
appellate court to 'order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact
relevant to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel/
The proceedings in this court are governed by rule 23B(e),
which provides:
Upon remand the trial court shall conduct hearings and
take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings shall be
conducted without a jury and as soon as practical after
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a
preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall
enter written findings of fact.
According to the Court of Appeals' order, the limited scope of
the hearing is to examine
(1) whether counsel's business Interests affected
counsel's performance in failing to explore offering
defendant's testimony in a possible criminal action
against counsel or his businesses in exchange for
leniency in the criminal action; and (2) whether
counsel's business interests affected his decision to
call defendant to testify at trial that he was not
impaired.
A
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The Court conducted a bearing on the natter on October 2,
1996. Defendant was represented by Richard P. Mauro and Robert K.
Heineman. The State was represented by Rodwicke Ybarra. The
defendant's only witness was James D. Mickelson, defendant's trial
counsel. The State did not call a witness.
With this background, the Court makes the following findings
of fact [page numbers refer to the hearing transcript]:
1.

In March 1994, defendant was charged with automobile homicide.

2.

James D. Mickelson acted as defendant's defense attorney from
the beginning of the action, through the preliminary hearing,
and through trial. He has been licensed to practice law in
Utah for twelve years, [p.5,72]

3.

Mickelson has stayed abreast of recent developments in how to
defend people charged with alcoholic beverage offenses,
[p.73]

4.

Charley's Club, Inc. and Uncle Bart's (collectively "the
clubs") are private clubs that serve alcohol. [p.6,11] By
law, they are not-for-profit entities, [p.56]

5.

While Mickelson was representing defendant, Mickelson served
as the registered agent, an officer (treasurer), and a member
of the "Governing Board of Trustees" of both of the clubs.
[p.7,exh. 1-3] As of the date of the hearing, Mickelson still
served in these positions, [p.58]

6.

The clubs are managed by and pay management fees to Club
Management, Inc., a for-profit entity. While Mickelson was
representing defendant, Mickelson was an officer, director,
registered agent, and 50% owner of Club Management, Inc.
[p.7-8,40,58,exh. 4-5] As of the date of the hearing, he
still served in these positions, [p.58].

7.

Club Management, Inc. owns all of the physical assets used in
the operation of the clubs, with the exception of the
consumable, personal property (e.g. the liquor, food), [p.€2]

8.

The clubs? and Club Management, Inc.'s other officers and
trustees were Mickelson's father, mother, sister, and thenwife, [p.10-14]

9.

The clubs' and Club Management, Inc. are the sole livelihood
for Mickelson's parents.
[p.114]
Mickelson received no
direct money from these entities, but may have received
attorney's fees for services he performed for the entities.
[p.7.23,114]
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10. Mlckelson and defendant had known each other on both a social
and business level for about 15 years prior to the trial.
They were on a first-name basis.
Mlckelson represented
defendant in the mid-1980's on a DUI matter in Tooele County.
Defendant had worked sporadically as a janitor and handyman
for the clubs. Ip.65-66,70,115]
11.

For twelve years, Mlckelson's law practice has involved
putting together corporations for private clubs. During that
time, he has become well acquainted with Utah's Dram Shop Act.
[p.14-15]

12.

The parents of the individual who was hit and killed by
defendant's car filed a civil action in November 1994.
[p.l7,exh. 6] Initially Mlckelson was individually named as
a defendant, but was later dismissed out of the case prior to
its going to trial, [p.20]

13.

Mlckelson has served as an attorney for the clubs and Club
Management, Inc. and has advised these entities on various
issues, [p.22] However, he did not represent these entities
in the civil action filed against them relating to the car
accident, [p.32,52]

14.

During his representation of defendant, Mlckelson was not
aware of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103, entitled "Criminal
responsibility for conduct of another." [p.23-25]

15. During his representation of defendant, Mlckelson was aware of
the following:
a.

the concept of comparative negligence,

[p.26]

b.

that the clubs faced potential liability under the Dram
Shop Act, including the possibility of punitive damages,
[p.26)

c.

that defendant could be liable for special, general, and
punitive damages, [p.27]

d.

that Utah's automobile homicide statute is two-tiered:
it provides for a second-degree felony, requiring a
higher degree of culpability, and a third-degree felony,
requiring a lesser degree of culpability, [p.28-30]

e.

that evidence generated at and the issues discussed at
the criminal trial would be used at the civil trial.
[p.36)
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f.

that in a subsequent civil suit, the clubs1 attorneys
would be loyal to the clubs1 interests and seek to limit
the clubs1 liability, [p.37]

g.

that there was a question about how much defendant had
had to drink the,day of the accident, [p.53]

16.

Soon after defendant's arrest, and at the request of a mutual
friend, Mickelson went to the jail to see defendant. They
talked about the charges generally and arranged for
defendant's personal affairs. Mickelson told him that he
could face a civil action. There was no talk of any possible
conflicts or waivers. Ip.30-31]

17.

Mickelson did not at any time disclose any possible conflicts
to any magistrate, judge, or prosecutor. Ip.32-33,39-40]

18.

Mickelson spoke privately with defendant about Mickelson1s
potential conflicts of interest on two occasions. No written
waiver was ever prepared, [p.34].

19.

The first occasion occurred sometime in March 1994, following
their initial meeting and prior to the preliminary hearing.
It took place at the jail. Mickelson brought up the subject..
Only Mickelson and defendant were present. Mickelson did not
take any notes in that meeting. [p.34-35,38,70] Mickelson
told defendant:

20.

a.

that if there were a civil action and if both the clubs
and defendant were named as defendants, there would be a
clear, actual conflict of interest, [p.38,44]

b.

that he, Mickelson, did not believe that there was a
conflict in the criminal case because Mickelson did not
see any criminal liability on the part of the clubs,
[p.39,47]

c.

that there was a possibility that because of the
potential conflict in the civil case, Mickelson might
unconsciously do something or not do something that would
affect his representation of defendant* [p.39,47]

d.

that he, Mickelson, would be loyal to defendant and that
he did not think his. association with the clubs would
affect his representation of defendant, [p.39]

e.

that defendant might want to have the issue reviewed by
another attorney, [p.47]

At some paint, defendant considered hiring Ron Yengich to
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represent him, but decided to stay with Mickelson.

[p.47-48]

21.

Defendant knew Mickelson and his family members were involved
in running the clubs because defendant had done work for the
clubs before, [p.38,68]

22.

The second occasion Mickelson and defendant discussed the
conflicts was more lengthy than the first. It occurred during
the summer of 1994. In preparation, Mickelson had reviewed
the Rules of Professional Conduct and discussed the conflict
issue with several attorneys in his office.
Mickelson
brought up the subject.
[p.34-35,39,48-49]
Mickelson
explained to defendant:
a.

that there may be a potential conflict if both the clubs
and defendant were named in the civil action.

b.

that, because of the conflict, Mickelson would not
represent either defendant or the clubs in the civil
action.

c.

that the prosecutors had not indicated any desire to file
criminal charges against the clubs.

d.

that there was a possibility that Mickelson's decisions
may be affected unconsciously by the conflict.

e.

that Mickelson would present the best possible defense
for defendant without any concern for what effect it may
have on the clubs, [p.50-51]

23.

Mickelson took notes on this second occasion. However, these
notes could not be located for the hearing. Following the
trial, Mickelson turned over all of the materials related to
defendant's case to the Legal Defender Association.
The
materials were later returned to Mickelson. In preparation
for the hearing, Mickelson searched the returned materials but
was unable to locate the notes, [p.34-35,39,48-49,87-89,11819]

24.

Both times after Mickelson brought up the potential conflicts,
defendant did not express any surprise or concern and merely
trusted and expressed confidence in Mickelson to represent
defendant's interests. Defendant asked Mickelson to continue
to represent him. [p.€9-70,72]

25.

Throughout his representation of defendant, and even after the
trial began, Mickelson attempted to obtain a plea bargain for
defendant. Because of the seriousness of the offense charged,
the defendant's numerous prior DUI convictions, and the great
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public interest in the case, the prosecutors would not offer
a plea bargain and indicated that they would only allow
defendant to plea to the charged count, [p.41,79-85]
26. Mickelson did not talk to the prosecutors about having
defendant testify as to misconduct by the clubs or the clubs'
employees in exchange for a plea bargain.
[p.41-42]
Mickelson was unaware of any case where such a situation had
occurred, [p.76,78]
27.

The clubs admitted that defendant had been in the clubs on the
date of the accident. The bartenders at the clubs both
testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated
while he was at the clubs, [p.42,50]

28.

Mickelson testified- -unrebutted by any other evidence or
testimony--that had he received any evidence that there was
any conduct on the part of the clubs that would have benefited
defendant, Mickelson would have immediately withdrawn from
defendant's case. [p.42]

29.

Defendant's criminal trial lasted six or seven days.
Defendant took the stand. Bis testimony on direct examination
comprised 6X pages of trial transcript.
On direct
examination, there was no mention that he had been drinking at
the clubs. [p.55,57]

30. Mickelson and defendant's strategy in having defendant testify
was to pursue the defense of a sudden emergency, i.e. that
there was an emergency situation that caused defendant to take
the actions he took, thereby lowering the normal standard of
care.
Defendant had indicated to Mickelson that another
vehicle had forced him into the emergency lane. None of the
other eye witnesses testified to this fact at trial. Other
than having defendant testify, there was no other way to get
that information to the jury and to have that defense
submitted to the jury by way of a jury instruction, [p.10308]
31.

Before defendant took the stand, Mickelson explained to
defendant how the prosecutor would likely cross-examine
defendant. Defendant agreed to go on the stand, [p.108-09].

32.

On cross-examination, defendant testified where he had been
drinking the day of the accident.
If defendant had not
testified during the trial, the clubs' identities would not
have come up at trial, [p.ill]

33.

Bad defendant offered a plea bargain before trial to have
defendant testify against the clubs, defendant would have had
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[p.112-13]

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether
he felt intoxicated at the time of the accident, [p.109]

35. After the trial, Mickelson advised defendant that it was not
appropriate for any trial attorney to represent a criminal
defendant on appeal and that he should obtain new appellate
counsel, [p.122-23]
36.

In the civil trial, punitive damages were assessed against the
clubs. These damages are not covered by insurance and will be
paid by the clubs^ [p.59,115]
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1

Q

Now, have you received specialized training with

2

regard to the effect of alcohol at various concentrations

3

of a person's system?

4

A

Other than specific medical school training based

5

on 30-odd years of practice and 16 years of practice in

6

the substance abuse field, I'm certified by the America

7

Society of Addiction Medicine.

8
9
10

Q

Now, you are familiar, are you not, with regard

to a measurement of blood alcohol content of weight per
volume, are you not?

11

A

Tes, sir.

12

Q

And you're aware of the legal standard for

13

driving a motor vehicle being not greater than .08; are

14

you not?

15

A

That's correct.

16

Q

Would you be familiar with a concentration of

17

alcohol, the meaning of a concentration of alcohol of .27?

18

A

That to me

19

Q

Weight per volume?

20

A

That to me would be a highly intoxicated

21

~

individual.

22

MR. MICKELSON:

23

THE COURTS

24
25

Objection.

The question was are you familiar

with it, "yea" or "no."
Sustained.
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1

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am familiar with that.

2

THE COURTt

3

interrupted.

And I'm sorry and I may have

What was your answer, •yes" or "no"?

4

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am familiar with that level.

5

THE COURT: Thank you.

€

Q

(By Mr. Ybarra) The next question would be,

7

then, what would you anticipate the effect of such a

8

concentration upon a person's coordination?

9
10

MR. MICKELSON:

Objection, your Honor, again rule

on expert witnesses.

11

THE COURT: This is not an expert witness as

12

such.

13

experience, and expertise that this individual possesses

14

and it does not fall within

15

This is asking based upon the qualification,

MR. MICKELSON:

~

They it goes to foundation, then,

16

as to ability of this witness to testify as an expert

17

expert in that area, the effects of alcohol on the system

18

with that kind of level of blood alcohol.

19

THE COURT:

~

If it's just a foundation objection,

20

then, I think that foundation has been established by his

21

experience, especially his education, his years in the

22

substance abuse areas since 1978, his duties as director

23

of —

24

alcohol treatment program, the fact that he has been

25

giving these lectures for 10 years or thereabouts if

medical director and instructor in the Dayspring
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1

that's —

2
3

HR. MICKELSON:

Is the State's motion to move to

have him qualified as an expert in this area?

4
5

any other objection?

THE COURT:

I haven't heard anything in that

extent.

6

MR. MICKELSONi

There's still lack of qualifying

7

this witness as an expert before we can proceed in this

8

area•

9

THE COURT:

In some jurisdictions there may be a

10

need to have a witness to be designated as such and have

11

the court accept them.

12

upon the training qualification.

13

they're not bound by any testimony and it's dependent upon

14

what they consider the educational requirements,

15

experience, et cetera of a witness to either accept or

16

reject their testimony. And that would be my instruction

17

to the jury at the appropriate ^ime.

18

MR. MICKELSON:

In this jurisdiction it's based
I would inform the jury

Thank you, your Honor. Again I

19

renew my objection, again, under the rules on expert

20

witnesses, and I believe they have crossed the line on

21

that area, would ask the Court to follow the statute on

22

expert witnesses at this point.

23

THE COURT:

I understand.

Thank you. And as I

24

understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this

25

witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27
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1

upon an individual based upon his training in the area and

2

experience and expertise.

3

MR. TBARRA*

4

THE COURTi

5

MR. MICKELSONs

Is that correct, Mr. —

That is correct.
~

Tbarra?

Thank you.

Tour Honor, as I understand that

€

calls for an expert opinion at this point in time, again

7

the State —

8
9

THE COURTS

Okay. And maybe you have

misunderstood me, Mr. Mickelson.

It's not necessary for

10

the State to ask me to accredit or to designate anybody as

11

an expert witness. That will be part of the instructions

12

that I am going to give to the jury, and it's going to be

13

up to the jury as to whether or not they accept that

14

person, based on foundation or not.

15

I have ruled that foundation is established. And

16

it's not necessary for the State to request of me, nor is

17

it necessary for me to designate this witness or any other

18

witness to be an expert.

19

MR. MICKELSON:

I understand that, your Honor,

20

and X accept that part of It*

21

are moving over into the expert opinion area with this

22

witness and he was not designated as an expert witness to

23

testify on the effects of —

24

THE COURTi

25

Q

At this point in time they

Tour objection is noted.

(By Mr. Tbarra)

Do you recollect the question as
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1
2
3
4
5
6

His Honor restated it?
A

I think the question was do I think this was a

level of intoxication that would impair coordination,
Q

Well, could you tell us what would be the effect

of someone with .27 blood alcohol content?
A

His coordination would certainly be affected.

7

For many individuals they would be approaching comatose

8

state at .27.

9
10

Q

And what would be his ability with regard to fine

motor coordination.

11

A

Very much impaired.

12

Q

And his ability to be aware of things that go on

13

around him?

14
15

MR. MICKELSON: Again, your Honor, objection as
to —

16

THE COURT: Qualified expert witnesses?

17

Thank you for objecting.

18

opportunity to further clarify my ruling.

19

That give me an

I am ruling that this is attendant to his

20

previous testimony, that he does tell people and instructs

21

people as to the effects of alcohol upon a person. Wasn't

22

that your previous testimony?

23

THE WITNESS! Yes, sir.

24

THE COURTS

25

And let me ask some questions of you

then. Dr. Kiddle ton. And in that regard, do you also tell
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1

them what kinds of effects they would have upon them as

2

you indicated, coordination, et cetera?

3

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

4

THE COURTS

5

And that is part of your program, is

it not?

6

THE WITNESSt

7

THE COURTt

Yes, sir.
And do you also take examples as to

8

different amounts of alcohol that could affect people when

9

you teach them?

10

THE WITNESSs

11

THE COURTS

12

From time to time we do that.
And did you from time to time, during

1987, to your recollection do that?

13

THE WITNESSs

From time to time, yeah.

14

THE COURTS

15

MR. MICXELSONs

Thank you.
Tour Honor, let me make this a

16

continuing objection at this point again.

17

problem with what he instructed people at various times in

18

1987. But as to opinions, as to persons with a certain

19

level of alcohol in their system, I'm going to make that

20

continuing objection. Any questions along that line

21

requires his opinion, then I will — my objection is --

22

before I make a continuing objection on the failure to

23

follow the statute on expert witnesses.

24
25

THE COURTS

I have no

Didn't you just hear the questions I

asked Dr. Middleton and those answers?

Those topics are
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1

included in his lectures, including his opinion, which he

2

has to give to someone when he is lecturing them as to the

3

effects of alcohol.

4

MR. KICKELSON: As long as he understand it's

5

opinion he gives to someone during that lecture. The

6

question here was his opinion as to somebody with that

7

level.

8
9
10
11
12
13

THE COURTS

and parcel of his process that he explained to people
through his lectures.
Q

(By Mr. Tbarra) Dr. Middleton, do you feel like

you fully answered that question as far as reasonably —
A

14
15

Yes, sir, I do.
MR. TBARRA:

THE COURT:

17

19

Then I have no further questions at

this time.

16

18

And as I explained, that was all part

Cross-examination?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MICRELSONx
Q

Dr. Middleton, you indicated that in 1987 that

20

what you instructed patients at that time would change

21

from various times to time; is that correct?

22

A

Basically, no. Basically what I teach is on this

23

chart.

Sometimes if there's some new information

~

24

certainly in 10 years there's been new information on

25

alcoholism —

that's added to it, but there's still the
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